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INSURANCE-DEATH OF iNsURED RESULTING FROM CRIMINAL ABORTION-RIGHT OF BENEFICIARY-Insured died as the result of a criminal abortion to which she had voluntarily submitted. The policies issued on her life
contained a provision to the effect that no benefits should be payable or recoverable should the insured die as a result of a violation of law. The insurer resisted
the action brought by the named beneficiary on the policy on two grounds: (a)
The insured's death was caused by her violation of law; (b) Although the
stated terms of the policy be held not to exclude the risk of death thus caused,
it would be contrary to public policy to allow recovery. Held, for plaintiff. Under Louisiana law a woman who solicits and submits to an illegal operation is
guilty of no crime, hence the policy covers death resulting from such an operation. Moreover, public policy does not stand in the way of enforcing such a
contract when the beneficiary is an innocent third party with vested rights.
Payne v. Louisiana Industrial Life Insurance Co., (La. 1948) 33 S. (2d) 444.
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It is everywhere agreed that in the absence of a statute to the contrary, an
insurer may exclude from coverage the risk of death caused by insur!c!d's violation of the law.1 The usual interpretation of "violation of the law" is that it
operates to prevent liability only where death proximately results from insured's
criminal act.2 Although the language of the provision would seem broad enough
to cover violations of civil laws as well, the standard 'interpretation is generally
justified on the dual grounds that criminal behavior is what was contemplated by
the parties, and that the narrow interpretation is most favorable to the insured. 8
Thus defeated on its contention that the risk was excluded by the terms of the
policy, the insurer here urged, on the basis of considerable authority, that the
enforcement of a policy insuring against the risk of death resulting from an
illegal operation, is against public policy. 4 The true basis of this position undoubtedly rests on the fundamental proposition that any contract tending to
endanger public interests by inducing illegal or immoral conduct is unenforceable. Perhaps the leading case on the point is Ritter v. Mutual Life Insurance
Co., which held that though there be no express exception of the risk of death
from suicide, an exception must be implied or else the policy will be deemed
illegal. 5 This holding met with almost unanimous disapproval in the state courts,
and has been impliedly repudiated by later decisions in the Supreme Court on
the question of suicide.6 Its unpopularity seems to have been one of the sources
of the line of decisions, relied upon by the court in the principal case, to the
effect that a named beneficiary who is guilty of no wrong in connection with the
death of the insured may enforce a policy, even though recovery would be
denied if it were payable to the estate of the insured. The reason usually
stated for this distinction is that a beneficiary with vested rights under a policy is
unaffected by the acts of the insured. 7 As has often been pointed out, to rest
such decisions on the nature of the beneficiary's interest is completely without
basis, for the contract is the source of all rights under it. If to insure against a
29 AM. JuR., Insurance, § 906, p. 692.
VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., 814 (1930). 17 A.L.R. 1005 (1922).
3
6 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw, § 1237 (1930).
4
Hatch v. Mut. Life Ins: Co., 120 Mass. 550 (1876); Wells v. New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 207, 43 A. 126 (1899); Jacob v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of America, 256 App. Div. 884, 9 N.Y.S. (2d) 27 (1939).
5
"A contract, the tendency of which is to endanger the public interests or injuriously affect the public good, or }Vhich is subversive of sound morality, ought never
to receive the sanction of a court of justice or be made the foundation of its judgment."
Mr. Justice Harlan, in Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139 at 154, 18 S.Ct.
300 (1898).
6
49 HARv. L. REv. 304 (1935) and cases there cited. Northwestern Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U.S. 96, 41 S.Ct. 47 (1920), noted in 30 YALE L.J.
401 (1921).
7
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Guller, 68 Ind. App. 544, n9 N.E. 173 (1918),
was particularly relied upon by the court in the principal case. Other cases supporting
this distinction are: Patterson v. Natural Premium Mutual Life Ins. Co., JOO Wis. n8,
75 N.W. 980 (1898); Seiler v. Economic Life Assn., 105 Iowa 87, 74 N.W. 941
(1898); Parker v. Des Moines Life Assn., 108 Iowa n7, 78 N.W. 826 (1899).
Cf. Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N.Y. 398, 67 N.E. 83 (1903).
1
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criminal act or an act contrary to public policy is illegal because of its tendency
to induce the prohibited activity, the illegality would seem to permeate the
entire contract.8 Probably the explanation of these decisions lies in a hesitancy
to disagree directly with the Supreme Court, coupled with a convicti"on that to
hold insurance covering death resulting from acts contrary to public policy to be
valid will not have any direct effect upon the occurrence of the undesirable conduct. Other reasons for distinguishing the right of a named beneficiary from
the right of the estate have been urged, all of which seem to be camouflage of
that which truly motivated the decision. Thus it has been said that to permit
recovery by the estate would be to allow the insured to benefit from his own
wrong, though it seems apparent that a dead man benefits in no real sense from
payments made to his estate.9 It may well be that the public interest would
suffer more through a denial of the right of indigent dependents to recover on
a policy not expressly excluding the risk in question than from the enforcement
of a policy such as was found to exist in the principal case. It is indeed regrettable that the court in the principal case saw fit to rest its decision on the nature
of the beneficiary's right, thus adding another to the line of decisions so justly
condemned as illogical arid misleading.

R. V. Wellman

8 Hopkins v. Northwestern Life Assurance Co., (C.C., E.D. Penn., 1899) 94 F.
729; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U.S. 234, 32 S.Ct. 220
(1912); VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., 544 (1930); 49 HARV. L. REV. 304 (1935).
9 8 L.R.A. (n.s.) II24 et seq. (1907).

